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Abstract
We develop a continuous time dynamic game to provide with a benchmark theory of Arab Spring-type events. We consider a resource-dependent
economy with two interacting groups, the elite vs. the citizens, and two
political regimes, dictatorship vs. a freer regime. Transition to the freer
regime can only be achieved if citizens decide to revolt given the concession/repression policy of the elite. Departing from the related literature,
the revolution optimal timing is an explicit control variable in the hands
of citizens. The elite is the strategic leader: she ultimately chooses her
policy knowing the reaction function of citizens. In this framework, we
provide with a full equilibrium analysis of the political regime switching
game and notably emphasize the role of the direct switching cost of the
citizens and of the elite's self-preservation options. In particular, we show
how the incorporation of explicit revolution timing may change the conventional wisdom in the related institutional change literature. Finally,
we emphasize how the theory may help explaining some key features of
the Arab Spring.
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1 Introduction
The Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia in late 2010, is arguably the most important event of the beginning of this century. While the political and geostrategic consequences of this event are not yet settled, it's enough to look a few
months or years backward to realize how it is important and somehow striking:
who could expect in early 2011 that erce dictators and regimes as those of
Benali or Mubarak will be ousted after quite a few weeks of heavy protests and
demonstrations? Who could expect the cascade of events which have aected
the whole Arab world after the Tunisian Jasmine revolution? A rst puzzling
aspect of the Arab Spring is henceforth the

timing.

Why did Arab populations

wait 4 or 5 decades (after independence) before revolting? All these countries
have in common the fact that they have been ruled for decades by elite controlling ercely the rents deriving either from the exploitation of natural resources
or from economic liberalization (like in Tunisia, celebrated as one of the most
open Arab countries by the World Bank's
prior to the Jasmine Revolution).
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Doing Business

successive surveys

A key research question is consequently

what does determine the decision of the opposition (that's the vast majority
of the population) to go for a revolution and the inherent timing in a context
where the ruling elite have all the economic and political powers in hands.
A second striking feature is

the large variety of outcomes observed so far.

In some cases, the ruling parties were eventually ousted (as in Tunisia or Egypt)
after weeks of deadly demonstrations. In others, the same demonstrations have
not been so successful and the incumbents remained in oce as in Bahrain which
ruling dynasty beneted from the external support of Saudi Arabia. A much
less bloody case is Algeria: with a mixture of repression and redistribution, the
elite have been able to retain the power (see Achy, 2011). Indeed, the January
2011 protests have led the Algerian government to markedly enlarge the scope
of its food subsidy program and its youth employment support packages (see
Boucekkine and Bouklia-Hassane, 2011).This variety of outcomes suggests the
following research questions: to which extent the use of redistribution/repression
by elite can explain this variety of outcomes observed?

Incidentally, couldn't

the elite, with all the powers in hands, systematically prevent the occurrence
of such moves by taking the adequate decisions, either erce/soft repression
and/or massive/moderate redistribution of the rents, in the right time?

The

research questions stated above cannot be properly addressed without two key
ingredients: in rst place, the dynamic aspects to be able to fully understand
the timing of the events, and in second place, the strategic aspects with ruling
elite acting as a strategic leader in the initial non-democratic regime.
Our research can be related to two distinct streams of the literature. The rst
strand of literature deals with the roots of conicts in fractionalized countries
with abundant natural resources.

Cross-country evidence suggests a positive
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was ranked in the Top 10 of the most reforming countries in the world by Doing
in 2008/2009, and Tunisia was ranked 55th out of 183 in 2011 by Doing Business
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correlation between rents from natural resources and civil wars. A major contribution along this line is the greed and grievance story told by Collier and
Hoeer (2004).

The authors outline that rebellion and conicts may be ex-

plained by severe grievances, such as high inequality, a lack of political rights,
or ethnic and religious divisions in society.

Several authors (see in particular

Torvik, 2002, Hodler, 2006, Mehlum et al., 2006, and Gonzalez, 2007) have
also pointed out that resource abundance induces political instability if competing factions try to obtain control over the associated rents. Resources cause
rent seeking and ghting activities between rival groups, which weaken property
rights and lead to a curse. In all this literature, there is no strategic structure
(with leadership by the elite), which - we believe - is the rst important feature
of the Arab Spring.

One exception is van der Ploeg and Rohner (2012) who

analyze in a two period game the extraction policy of an incumbent government
that is subject to a threat of rebellion. In such a situation, the government has
an incentive to extract the resource much faster than under peace (or cooperation). This is coined the rapacious resource exploitation. But this is not a paper
on political regime changes or revolutions.
Indeed, our work is more closely related to the second literature on political transitions.

In a series of papers and a book, Acemoglu and Robinson

(2000a,b, 2001 and 2006) present an analysis of the transition from dictatorships to democracies driven by the interaction between the rich elite and the
poor citizens. Those two groups typically play a game where the sequence of
moves is as follows: the elite rst choose between dierent mutually exclusive
strategies - repression, democratization or redistribution - and then the poor
people decide whether they initiate a costly revolution. Even though democratization is costly (since it boils down to a transfer of power from the elite to the
citizens), they show that it can be the elite's optimal strategy, given the threat
of revolution. In these contributions however, the dynamic dimension is almost
lacking,

i.e.

there is no accumulation of capital or management of a natural

resource, and timing decisions are not considered.
In this paper, we develop a full-edged dynamic game framework to provide
with a benchmark theory of Arab Spring-type phenomena. In this framework,
we rst introduce the hierarchical dimension: Elite do act as a strategic leader.
Second, the considered games explicitly distinguish between the pre-revolution
regime (dictatorship of the elite) and the post-revolution regime (say, common access to resources). Finally and more importantly, the determination of
(Markov perfect) equilibria includes the timing of the transition (if it occurs)
from the rst to the second regime.

This ultimately leads to a methodologi-

cal innovation as the latter requires merging dynamic games with multi-stage
optimal control (see Boucekkine et al., 2013 for the use of multi-stage optimal
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control in a non-strategic model of technology adoption).

In the rst regime, the elite have full control on the resources (to be taken

2 Two related papers are Boucekkine et al., 2011 and Long et al., 2014. But, among other
notable dierences, the former is only concerned with open-loop equilibria, and the latter does
not have a strategic leader structure.

3

in a broad sense, they could either come from an  unmodeled  extraction
sector or from globalization,

e.g.

from FDIs or import licenses for example) and

decides about: i) how much resources to transfer to population (redistribution or
concession), ii) how much to use for own consumption, iii) how much resources
to employ for repression (modeled as a ow) and iv) how much to invest. The
production function is AK to have a chance to extract (partial) analytical results.
Of course, redistribution and/or repression are the instruments the elite may use
(simultaneously or not, we examine both cases) to retain the power in exchange
for own consumption and investment. From the point of view of the elite, neither
redistribution nor repression makes sense in the absence of a revolution threat.
Given the elite' policy, the opposition has to decide whether she rebels (or not)
against the elite and
tradeo is the

when

(if she does so).

A key aspect in the opposition

direct (political regime) switching costs

(DSC hereafter) faced.

These costs depend either on the repression exerted by the elite and/or their
allies (possibly foreign countries) or on the coordination costs inherent in any
collective action. Knowing the resulting reaction function of the opposition, the
elite as strategic leaders will then choose their optimal redistribution and/or
repression policies.
In this framework, we make three distinct sets of contributions. On the technical ground, it's to the best of our knowledge the rst analysis providing with
an explicit characterization of the optimal timing of revolutions (in continuous
time) in the growing literature of endogenous institutional change. This is far
from a pure technicality. We do show that such a new dimension may change
the typical wisdom in this literature stream (see just below for a rst insight).
As a second set of contributions, we deliver a comprehensive equilibrium analysis of the political regime switching game and notably emphasize the role of
the direct switching cost of the citizens and of the elite's self-preservation options (redistribution and/or repression).

3 In the particular case where the elite

make concession (only), which indirectly aects the citizens' uprising decision,
we show that this instrument may not be sucient to avoid a revolution. The
direct switching cost is crucial in determining the equilibrium outcome. When
this cost is low, a political regime switching always occurs. The key point is then
to understand how the elite optimally adapt to the overthrow of their political
power. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we nd that the optimal strategy for
the elite is to redistribute as many resources as possible to the people in the
rst dictatorial regime. This result clearly diers from the rapacious resource
exploitation emphasized by van der Ploeg and Rohner (2012). It highlights the
importance of the rst striking aspect underlined above,

i.e.

the timing of events

of our revolution game. Once this temporal dimension is taken into account, it
comes at no surprise that making high redistribution levels is worthwhile since it
allows the elite to lengthen the period of political and economic control. When
the direct switching is high, the elite are able to provide sucient transfers to
the opposing citizens and choose the lowest level of redistribution compatible

3 The situation where the elite use both concession and repression has not been explored
in the literature.
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with a permanent dictatorship.

The same kind of results are obtained when

the elite decide to keep the people under control through repressive means.
Repression makes it possible to directly change the switching cost and generally implies that there is more room for self-preservation. In situations where
neither repression (only) nor redistribution (only) prevent the elite from being
removed, a policy-mix between these two instruments succeeds in maintaining
the non-democratic regime. Based on the criterion of retaining power, there is
a temptation to conclude that this policy-mix is the best strategy for the elite.
However, it is not always true that the payos associated with an equilibrium
featuring a permanent dictatorship are higher than those corresponding to a
solution with a regime change. Finally, our third set of contributions concerns
the understanding of the Arab Spring.

We emphasize how the results of our

theoretical model may help explaining why some countries have experienced a
transition to (more) democratic political regimes while others are still stuck in
dictatorships.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the details of our dynamic setup. Section 3 explains the problem faced by each player in the two
possible regimes. It allows us to discuss the benchmark case when a revolutionary threat is absent.

We formally examine the political game when the elite

adopt a strategy based on concession for

given

DSC in Section 4.

Section 5

then analyzes the other polar case where the elite repress the citizens in order
to keep them under control when i/ repression is the unique determinant of the
DSC and ii/ both instruments are used simultaneously. Section 6 discusses the
implications of our analysis for the Arab Spring. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

2 The setup
We consider a modied AK growth model where the representative agent is
replaced by two innitely lived groups. We note them as the following players:
the incumbent elite (E ) and the opposition (P , for the poor citizens). These
groups comprise a fractionalized society with a resource-dependent economy.
We abstract from any assumption regarding the size of the population and each
rival group. Emulating the framework of Lane and Tornell (1996), let
stock of resources and

A

the rate of return on this asset.

Resources

K

be the

are dened

in a broad sense and may refer to economic resources, or wealth and windfalls
from natural resources.
There are two political or institutional regimes that describe the ways in
which these groups interact: dictatorship (regime
common access to the resources (regime

2),

1)

and a freer regime with

the switch from regime 1 to regime

2 being the result of a successful revolution by the citizens.
initially belongs to regime

1.

The economy

In this regime, the elite have the full control

over the economy and the economic resources and has to divide them between
three dierent uses: self-preservation, consumption, and investment. In order to
lengthen the dictatorial system, the elite may choose either to make concessions
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to the citizens or to rely on repression. Self-preservation through concessionary

1 − uE

spending takes the form a transfer of a share
opposition.
a choice

of the output

AK

to the

More formally, the concession strategy of the elite is modeled as

uE ∈ [uE , uE ],

where

uE ,

the share of resources accruing to the elite,

also represents the inequality in the access to economic resources. Alternatively
or jointly, the elite may decide to opt for a repression strategy. The repression
strategy consists of a ow of military expenditures

rE ∈ [rE , rE ],

that can be

interpreted as bribes paid to those who repress (or a periodic xed cost to pay
to benet from the protection to get some military support).
Importantly enough, we model concession and repression as once-and-for-all
strategies.

Clearly these strategies are not standard continuous control vari-

ables because there is no instantaneous tradeo related to their choices. They
basically provide the elite with a set of instruments that can be used in order to
aect the citizens' decision to revolt (think about the leader-follower structure
of the problem). Now, one may allow the elite to revise these choices at some
points in time,

i.e.

one may model

uE

rE

and

as discrete control variables.

This would make sense in a changing institutional and economic environment
(in regime 1), which is not the case here. That's why, for simplicity, we consider
constant

uE

and

rE

and assume that the commitment mechanism of the elite

is credible.
Let

CE

t.4

Then, the dynamics of the

K̇ = uE AK − CE − rE ,

(1)

be the elite's consumption at period

stock of economic resources are:

with

K(0) = K0 ,

given.

Citizens' only source of wealth is from the elite's transfers, used for consumption:

CP = (1 − uE )AK .5

Concessions and repression aect the revolution

strategy of the citizens in two dierent ways. From the expression of the citizens' consumption, one can easily see that concessions indirectly shape citizens'
decisions by modifying the opportunity cost of the revolution.
equal, the higher the transfer (the lower

uE ),

Other things

the lower the incentive to revolt.

In contrast, repression directly impinges upon the opposition. It is worth clarifying this point by describing the sequence of events leading to a regime change
and its consequences. A switch from regime

1

to regime

2

results from a revo-

lution by the opposition. A revolution (if any) succeeds with probability one.
A revolt is associated with a global cost

χ > 0.
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This is the continuous time

4 When there is no risk of confusion, the time index is omitted.
5 Leaving aside self-preservation, regime 1 is the one wherein the

elite consume and invest,
while the opposition only consumes. This structure shares similarities with the literature on
the interaction between capitalists and workers (Lancaster, 1973, Hoel, 1978), except that in
our framework citizens are completely passive and subject to the control of the elite.
6 One may argue that uncertainty matters since it surrounds both the success of a revolution
and the duration or stability of a successful revolution. To account for uncertainty, we may
have assumed that the probability of success is less than one. We may also have considered
that the second regime is not an absorbing state by adding the possibility to switch back from
the second to the rst regime. However, any tractable version of our problem with uncertainty
would not bring much to the analysis.
6

analog of Acemoglu et al. (2012) who assume that a xed amount of resource
is destroyed when violent uprisings occur:

K(T + ) = K(T ) − χ,

(2)

which means that the state variable experiences a downward jump at the right
of the switching time

strategy

T,

provided that

T

is nite.

T

represents the

switching

of the citizens.

Besides the global cost for society, when conducting a revolt, the opposition
incurs a direct switching cost (DSC),
collective action,
instigate conict.

i.e.

ψ > 0.

This cost may capture eorts from

the opposing citizens need to coordinate when trying to

Or, the magnitude of the DSC can also be interpreted as

a measure of regime vulnerability.

The higher is this cost, the more dicult

it is for the opposition to lead a popular uprising against the ruling elite.
crucial issue concerns the

controllability

of the DSC by the elite.

A

Indeed,

one can classify factors that aect the DSC in terms of controllability. Among
controllable factors are repression, the education policy or external support of
the elite's regime. For example, one might think that the larger the education
level of a country, the lower the coordination costs inherent in collective actions,
and the larger the probability of revolts. If the education system is fully managed
by the elite, this revolution channel is under control.

7 Uncontrollable factors

include the globalized environment (communication networks, contagion eects
etc.), demographic aspects and external intervention unsolicited by the elite.
Also, any situation inducing massive grievance is likely to signicantly ease
coordination for a collective action against the elite.

We shall mention mass

youth unemployment in Arab countries as an example of such a situation in
Section 6.
In our theoretical analysis, all factors except repression will be considered as
exogenous. Thus, the DSC is supposed to be partially controllable through

rE

and we will study the polar cases where the DSC is fully exogenous (Section 4)

vs

controllable (Section 5) via

rE .

The inuence of other factors will be further

discussed in Section 6. Hereafter, we make an assumption that conveys the basic

8

idea that repression makes the cost of revolting relatively higher.

Assumption 1 ψ(rE )

and ψ (rE ) ≤ 0.
00

from [rE , rE ] to [ψ, ψ], with 0 < ψ < ψ < ∞, ψ0 (rE ) > 0

After a revolution, the system switches to regime

2 where common access to
K simply becomes:

economic resources prevails. The dynamics of the stock

K̇ = AK − CE − CP .

(3)

7 Galor et al. (2009) is an excellent illustration of this mechanism in the context of the
industrial revolution, in particular through the role of landowners in the late emergence of
public education (in England for example).
8 To echo footnote 7, we may have alternatively assumed that a revolution does not succeed
with probability one and make the probability of success dependent on the level of repression.
This would not change the general message delivered by the subsequent analysis.
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Our view is that this second regime is characterized by more (political)
freedom but may not be a well functioning democracy yet. Put dierently, our
groups engage in a political rent-seeking competition (Lane and Tornell, 1996):
Both groups try to extract transfers from resource wealth in a non-cooperative
manner.

The elite are no longer a leader but survives to the revolution,

i.e.

continues to take decisions even after she loses the control of the economy. This
assumption diers from what is usually done in the literature (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006). We do believe however that it is relevant characteristic of Arab
countries like Tunisia where the Arab Spring events have successfully overthrown
the ruling dynasty or political elite but have failed to renew the economic elite,
which basically remain the same.
The preferences of the two groups are the same and invariant with the regime.

U (Cij ) = ln(Cij ) with i = E, P and
preference is ρ and the time horizon is innite.

A logarithmic function is utilized, e.g.

j = 1, 2.

The rate of pure time

The next sections are devoted to the analysis of the political regime change
game under concessions and repression.

3 Interaction within the two-stage game
For the time being, let us take the leader-follower structure of our model as
given and suppose a revolution takes place in nite time.

The optimization

problem can be decomposed into two subproblems, one for each regime. This
is solved backward starting from the dierential game that characterizes the
second regime. All technical details are relegated in the appendix A.

3.1

Second regime: Post-revolution game

After the revolution, the two groups interact in a common-pool resource dierential game. Indeed, regime 2 is characterized by the lack of strong institutions.
It can be seen as reduced form model where each group has its own resource
stock, with ability to appropriate part of the other's wealth (Lane and Tornell,
1996).

Given the structure of the model described above, this game is sym-

metric. Using Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) as the solution concept and
guessing linear feedback strategy for players, which implies that
with

a j , bj

Cj = aj + bj K

i solves:
Z ∞
max
ln(Ci )e−ρt dt

two constants, player

{Ci }

subject to (3), given

T

K(T + ) = K̃ − χ,

where

K̃

is the level of the capital

stock at the instant of the revolution, and the guess formulated above. Direct
manipulations of the necessary optimality conditions yield the value obtained
by each player at the MPE (the superscript 2 refers to the second regime):

Vi2 (K̃



A
1
ln(ρ) + ln(K̃ − χ) + − 2
− χ) =
ρ
ρ
8

for

i = E, P,

(4)

where

ρ

is the share of the capital stock "consumed" by each player and

is the resulting growth rate of

K.

A − 2ρ

As far as growth prospects are concerned,

a restriction on the parameters is imposed, which is necessary and sucient to
ensure that the regime following a revolution is compatible with non-negative
growth:

The productivity parameter is high enough compared to the discount rate: A − 2ρ ≥ 0.

Assumption 2

This assumption is the most relevant in our AK model where the analysis is
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conducted in terms of the balanced growth path.

Using this value in (4) as the continuation payo, the next subsection analyzes the problem faced by the elite in the autocratic regime.

3.2

First regime: Elite's control in autocracy

The analysis is conducted given self-preservation,

(uE , rE ),

and revolution,

T,

strategies. It will be the purpose of the next section to solve the game in these
specic strategies. The problem faced by the elite given the potential occurrence
of a revolution at some date

can be expressed as follows:

T

Z

ln(CE )e−ρt dt + e−ρT VE2 (K̃ − χ)

max
CE

T

0

K(0) = K0 , and given that T 5 ∞. The level K(T ) = K̃ is
T < ∞ and the relevant transversality condition is also dependent on
whether T 5 ∞. In fact the crucial point is that the elite don't directly choose
whether T 5 ∞. However, in some circumstances, they will be able to inuence

subject to (1),
free if

the choice of the citizens to revolt or not.
For the time being, we can say a word about the particular case of a permanent autocratic regime. The fact that regime 1 lasts forever means that either
the citizens choose not to revolt, i.e. adopt a never switching strategy

T = ∞,

or the elite face no threat of revolution. In any case, it is very simple to characterize the behavior of the elite having permanent control over both the political
system and the economy. Solving the control problem above for

T = ∞,

the

resulting present value, for the elite, is given by (superscript 1 is for regime 1):

VE1 (uE , rE )





rE
uE A
1
ln(ρ) + ln K0 −
+
−1 .
=
ρ
uE A
ρ

(5)

(uE , rE ) is said to be admissible if and only if it satises
rE
. In the remainder of the paper, we'll pay attention to admissible pairs
uE A
rE
only (alternatively, we may impose K0 >
uE A ). The growth rate of the elite's

A pair of instruments

K0 >

consumption is equal to

g = uE A − ρ.

As it is apparent from (5), modifying

9 Allowing for negative post-revolution growth, as it is observed in Tunisia or Lybia following

the Arab Spring revolutions, would only make sense in the transitional dynamics, i.e. in the
short run, that are absent here.
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the sharing rule is accompanied by a positive

growth eect.

By increasing

uE ,

the elite have more resources available for consumption and investment. This
stimulates growth.

In addition, there is also a positive scale eect.

the level of repression, an increase in

uE

Given

also implies that the elite have more

resources left for consumption. In the absence of revolution threat, the optimal
choice of the elite is to set the sharing rule to the largest possible value,

uE .

i.e.

to

The repression decision only involves a negative scale eect. So, it is also

clear that when the elite don't have any political challenger, there is no incentive
to repress and the optimal repression level is
will take

rE = 0.

rE .

For simplicity, hereafter, we

Finally, note that the present value earned by the citizens, in

this case, is:

VP1 (uE , 0)



1
uE A
=
ln((1 − uE )A) + ln(K0 ) +
−1 .
ρ
ρ

(6)

While they also benet from the growth eect associated with an increase in

uE ,

they incur a negative

rent capturing eect.

Increasing

uE

means that the

elite grab more resources at the expense of the opposition.
Of course, when a revolutionary threat is present, one logically expects that
the elite will no longer be able to set their instruments to the levels

rE = 0.

uE

and

In the subsequent section, we precisely address this issue by solving the

two-stage game in self-preservation and timing strategies.

4 Equilibrium under the concession strategy
The purpose of the analysis is twofold. First, we want to discuss the conditions
under which a revolution might occur or, on the contrary the elite might stay
in power forever.

Second in case of unavoidable uprising, we wonder what is

the best strategy for the elite. Having set out the citizens' switching problem,
we will pursue the equilibrium analysis in the particular case where the elite
only use concessions. Equilibrium outcomes when the elite also may repress the
citizens will be presented in Section 5. The proofs are displayed in the Appendix
B.

4.1

Timing of the revolt

If the opposition nds it optimal to challenge political control by the elite, then
she earns the following present value:

Z
VP (K0 , T ) =

T

ln(CP1 )e−ρt dt + e−ρT [VP2 (K̃ − χ) − ψ(rE )].

(7)

0
The optimal condition for switching results from the maximization of (7) w.r.t

T,

which yields:

ln(CP1 (T )) − ρVP2 (K̃ − χ) = −ρψ(rE ).
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This condition basically states that if there exists an optimal

T

for switching

then the marginal benet from delaying the switch (LHS) must be equal to
the marginal direct switching cost at this instant (RHS). Given that

(1 − uE )AK̃ , this condition can be rewritten as:10
ln

K̃
K̃ − χ

!

Denote the RHS of (8) as

A
= − 2 + ln
ρ
ω(uE , rE )



ρ
[1 − uE ]A

CP1 (T ) =


− ρψ(rE ).

(8)

and dene the critical threshold for the

DSC as follows:

1
ψ̃(uE ) =
ρ



A
− 2 + ln
ρ

The ordering between the actual DSC,



ρ
[1 − uE ]A

ψ(rE ),


(9)

and the threshold,

ψ̃(uE ),

ultimately determines if it is optimal for people to instigate a revolution. Expression (9) illustrates that if redistribution doesn't aect the DSC directly, it
does change the opportunity cost of switching. This is apparent when looking
at the term in the log, which is the ratio between the share of

K

consumed

by the people in the second (numerator) and rst (denominator) regimes. An
increase in

ψ̃ ,

uE

(meaning that the elite redistribute less) implies an increase in

i.e. the opportunity cost of a revolution falls down.
Before going any further, it is worth mentioning that two polar cases can

be considered, according to the controllability of the DSC. When the elite rely
on redistribution only to keep the citizens under control, the DSC is said to be
non controllable.

On the contrary, the situation where the elite make use of

repression (together or not with concessions) is referred to as the controllable
DSC case.

For the sake of exposure, in the remainder of this section we pay

attention to the non controllable DSC case.
the elite have to choose

ψ(rE ) = ψ .
4.2

uE ∈ [uE , uE ]

In other words, we assume that

rE = 0,

and set

which implies that

The analysis of the second case is postponed to section 5.

Citizens' regime switching strategy

In all this section the aim is to characterize the solution to the switching problem
for

uE ∈ [uE , uE ]

given. A rst step towards this goal is to dene the higher

uE .

redistribution rate the elite are able to set,

To do so, let's go back to

the situation of permanent autocracy in the absence of threat of revolution (as
briey exposed in Section 3.2). Here the basic idea we want to convey is that
the elite should take advantage of a permanent autocratic regime by earning
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a value no lower than the one of the citizens:

uE ∈ [uE , uE ].

VE1 (uE , 0) ≥ VP1 (uE , 0)

for all

This leads us to impose:

10 This is the necessary condition for the switching time. The sucient optimality condition
is satised if and only if K̇(T ) ≥ 0. Assumption 2 and the forthcoming assumption 3 (Section
4.2) will be enough to get this point.
11 Expression of the values are given in (5) and (6), when substituting u with u .
E
E

11

At the equilibrium with redistribution only, the lower bound of
the domain of denition of uE is dened such that VP1 (uE ) = VE1 (uE ). This is
equivalent to uE = 1 − Aρ .
Assumption 3

ρ
A in (9) yields the expression of the threshold
1 A
DSC that matters for the citizens' switching decision: ψ̃(uE ) = ψ̃u = { − 2}.
ρ ρ
Replacing

uE

with

uE = 1 −

12

Then, it can be established that:

Lemma 1 A necessary and sucient condition for the existence of a solution
to (8) is: ω(uE ) > 0.
1. If ψ < ψ̃u (low DSC) then, ω(uE ) > 0 for all uE ∈ [uE , uE ]: There
always exists a unique K̃(uE ) for switching with,

K̃(uE ) =

2. Else, ψ ≥ ψ̃u (high

χeω(uE )
.
eω(uE ) − 1

(10)

), there exists a critical threshold ũE such that
with,

DSC

ω(uE ) > 0 ⇔ uE > ũE

ρ ρ(ψ̃u −ψ)
e
,
A
ũE > uE .

ũE = 1 −

this threshold is admissible i.e.

Irrespective of the size of the global switching cost,

(11)

χ,

the occurrence of a

political regime change is more likely when the DSC is low enough. For a high
enough DSC, the decision to undertake a revolution will be bound to the sharing
of resource xed by the elite. So, the actual DSC and its position compared to
the threshold

ψ̃u

is of crucial importance to understand the options available

to the elite. Clearly, when the DSC is low, the elite can't avoid the revolution
through concessions and the question is what is their best strategy given that
the regime change is inevitable. By contrast, when the cost of switching regime
is high enough, the elite seem to have the choice between making sizeable concessions in order to stay in power forever or grabbing a lot of economic resources
in the rst regime till a switch to regime 2 occurs.
To complete the characterization of the solution to the switching problem,
we next prove that

Lemma 2

The optimal switching time is implicitly given by
K0 e(uE A−ρ)T = χ



1
eω(uE ) − 1

+ e−ρT


.

(12)

This equation has a unique solution, denoted by T (uE ), if and only if
K̃(uE ) > K0 ⇔

χeω(uE )
> K0 .
−1

eω(uE )

(13)

where K̃(uE ) is dened in (10).
12 With

a slight abuse of notation, we no longer make the dependance on rE = 0 explicit.
12

Lemma 2 states that the switching level must be higher than the initial stock.
This implies that the opposition allows the resource to accumulate rst. This
ensures that the remaining cake after the switch is high enough to compensate
for the loss incurred during the regime change. This also guarantees that what
is competed for in the common access regime is abundant.
Let's interpret the pair

(T (uE ), K̃(uE ))

as the reaction function of the citi-

zens. From (10) and (12), it appears that:

(

∂ K̃
∂uE
∂T
∂uE

< 0;
< 0;

∂ K̃
∂χ > 0;
∂T
∂K0 < 0;

∂ K̃
∂ψ
∂T
∂χ

> 0;
> 0;

∂T
∂ψ

> 0.

As expected the desired switching level, for the citizens, is decreasing in
The higher

uE ,

the lower the opportunity cost of switching. A high

uE

uE :

implies

that the rst regime is painful for the citizens. In contrast, the higher the GSC
or the DSC, the higher the desired switching level of resource. This is due to the
cake size eect. Regarding the switching date, the revolution will occur more
rapidly if the elite choose an unequal sharing rule during the rst regime. The
switching date decreases with the initial endowment too. The more abundant
is the initial stock of natural resource in the economy, the more rapidly will
conict occur. With a higher initial stock, the resource level that triggers the
revolt is achieved earlier.

This observation is consistent with resource curse

literature related to civil wars (see Hodler, 2006; Ploeg and Rohner, 2012 for
detailed examples). Finally, the impact of a change in the switching costs on

T

is positive.

To make the revolt valuable, the citizens must accept a longer

phase of resource accumulation during the rst regime in order to reach a larger

K̃(uE )

that will compensate for the cost.

Let's now turn to the analysis of the elite's problem of choosing a redistribution level given the reaction function dened above.

4.3

Elite's concession strategy

Assuming that a regime change will occur in nite time, we examine the choice
of the sharing rule by the elite. The elite have to pick up a

uE

from the right

domain. According to Lemma 1, this domain varies depending on whether the
DSC is low or high: The relevant interval is

[uE , uE ]

(resp.

(ũE , uE ])

when the

DSC is low (resp. high). Whatever the case, this choice is made taking as given
the reaction function. The value obtained by the elite in the equilibrium with
an interior regime switching is:

Z

T (uE )

VE (uE ) =

1
ln[CE
(uE )]e−ρt dt + e−ρT (uE ) VE2 [K̃(uE ) − χ].

(14)

0

VE w.r.t. uE is:

1
E)
R T (uE ) ∂CE∂u(t;u


E

e−ρt dt
1

The derivative of

0
CE (t;uE )
∂VE (uE )
=
0
−ρT (uE )
1
+T
(u
)e
{ln[CE
(T (uE ))] − ρVE2 [K̃(uE ) − χ]}
E

∂uE

2

∂V [K̃(u )−χ] 0
+e−ρT (uE ) E ∂KE
K̃ (uE )
13

(15)

The rst term represents the cumulative impact of a change in the redistribution rate on consumption. The second positive term states a comparison
between the cost and benet at the switching time

T (uE ).

The term between

the brace brackets is the marginal gain of delaying the switch. It is weighted
by the derivate of the switching date w.r.t

uE ,

which is negative. It compares

the discounted value of what the elite gain in the second regime, and her loss
in utility (from consumption) during the switch. The third term exhibits the
remaining cake size eect. This is always negative as

K̃ 0 (uE ) < 0.

Simply put,

this term indicates the loss due to resource destruction at the start of the second

13 The exercise of signing the whole derivative leads to:

regime.

E)
be the elasticity of the switching date with
Let σ(T ) = uETT(u(u
E)
respect to the sharing rule uE . If |σ(T )| ≤ 1 for all admissible uE , then
∂VE (uE )
< 0.
∂uE
0

Lemma 3

It turns out that what is central to the elite's decision is the impact of
a change in

uE

uE

on their consumption during the rst regime.

A change in

is associated with two dierent  growth and scale  eects.

is a positive

growth eect.14

A larger

uE

The rst

implies greater investment.

This

eventually translates into a higher consumption growth rate. The second scale
eect is the combination of two opposing forces: When

uE

increases, the elite

are able to consume more simply because less resources are redistributed to
the people.

However, increasing

the revolution

T (uE ),

uE

always decreases the time to go before

which increases the regime vulnerability and tends to

impair consumption. If

|σ(T )| ≤ 1,

the former eect dominates the latter and

consumption, at any time in the rst regime, is increasing in

uE .

This condition

states that the switching time chosen by the citizens is not too sensitive to the
sharing rule. This is a relevant characteristic of resource-dependent economies
with mediocre levels of social capital, e.g. awareness towards collective action.
We have now the key elements to summarize the properties of the equilibrium
under redistribution only:

Proposition 1

Under the conditions of Lemmas 1-3,

•

When the DSC is low, there exists a unique equilibrium where the elite
choose u∗E = uE and the revolution occurs in nite time T (uE ).

•

When it is high, the unique equilibrium is the one where the elite stay in
power forever (T = ∞) and set the redistribution to the critical rate ũE .

13 An alternative reading of the expression in (15) is that the impact of a change in u can
E
be divided between three dierent eects, depending on the period during which the change is
felt: The marginal impact of choosing uE before the regime change (rst term), the marginal
impact at this instant of the regime change (second term) and the marginal impact of varying
uE after the political switch (last term).
14 Under Assumptions 3 and 2, elite's consumption growth rate, g = u A − ρ, is positive in
E
the autocratic regime.
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Not surprisingly the magnitude of the DSC is crucial to determine the nature
of the equilibrium. When the DSC is low, given that a revolt will occur in nite
time, one may expect that the elite's optimal strategy is to set the sharing rule
to the highest possible value

uE

as this would allow them take advantage of their

period of control. This is the kind of message delivered by the related literature
(see for instance Ploeg and Rohner, 2012). It turns out that the optimal choice
of the elite is the exact opposite,
concessions possible.

timing,

i.e.

they choose to proceed to the largest

This quite surprising result emphasizes the role of the

which is typically ignored by the literature. Once we account for the

timing issue, it comes at no surprise that setting

uE

is good to the elite.

It

allows her to delay the regime switching and to lengthen the duration in oce.
With a high DSC, the elite have the capacity to inuence the opposition's
switching decision. The ex-ante trade-o is as follows: Either they make sucient concessions by sharing the resource in such a way that citizens are not too
harmed an don't instigate conict.

Or, they decide on a very unfair redistri-

bution rule, which may trigger the revolution in nite time. Ex-post, it can be
shown that the optimal decision is to set the redistribution rate to the lowest
redistribution compatible with permanent autocracy. Indeed, when the DSC is
high enough, avoiding the revolution doesn't cost so much to the elite. In order
to stay in power, the elite have just to concede some resources (the lower the
threshold, the lower the concession) to the citizens.

5 Beyond redistribution: The repressive option
From now on, the DSC is supposed to be controllable thanks to repression. We
start with the other limit case where the elite use repression only and have to
choose a

rE ∈ [0, rE ]

given that

uE = uE

(no concessions). Next, we examine

the most general (realistic) version of the model where the elite choose a mix
of the two instruments.

Given that the methodology is largely inspired from

Section 4, we move to the results as quickly as possible.

5.1

Equilibrium under the repression strategy

In this section, the aim is to present and discuss the counterpart of Lemma
1 & 3 and proposition 1 in the case where the elite adopt the repressive option only (all the proofs are in the Appendix C). Suppose that
the largest possible value,

uE .

(9), we shall work with a new threshold value for the DSC:

1
ρ



ln(ρ) − ln[(1 − uE )A] +

A
ρ

uE

is xed at

Then from the citizens' switching problem and


− 2 .15

ψ̃r = ψ̃(uE ) =

We obtain

A necessary and sucient condition for the existence of a solution
to the switching problem of the citizens is: ω(rE ) = ω(rE , uE ) > 0.
Lemma 4

15 Naturally we have ψ̃ > ψ̃ : Other things equal, when the elite don't provide any transfers
r
u
to the citizens, they are willing to revolt for a relatively lower switching cost. The main
dierence with the rst case is that now the elite can directly modify this switching cost.
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1. If ψ ≥ ψ̃r then dictatorship is necessarily permanent.
2. If ψ < ψ̃r (low returns to repression, RR) then the revolution is
ω(rE )
unavoidable and occurs for a switching level K̃(rE ) = eχe
ω(rE ) −1 .
3. If ψ ≥ ψ̃r > ψ (high RR) then there exists a critical repression level
r̃E = ψ −1 (ψ̃r ) such that: Any rE < r̃E will trigger a revolution in nite
time whereas choosing rE ≥ r̃E is a means to avoid the revolution.
The solution in the rst case is trivial.

From the discussion conducted in

Section 3.2, in the absence of revolution threat, the optimal solution is
By analogy with Section 4, two interesting cases remain.

∗
rE
= 0.

On the one hand,

when the RR are low, the elite are not able to keep the citizens under control
and the political regime change is inevitable. On the other, the elite may avoid
the revolution provided that the repression technology is ecient enough and
by investing at least

r̃E

in military expenditures. Put dierently, a permanent

policy that consists in devoting a constant level of resources

r̃E

to the military

budget protects the elite from an uprising of the citizens.
Working with

rE

given, we next deal with the switching time

T (rE ),

which

is uniquely and implicitly dened by (see the Appendix C):


K0 −
with

K̃(rE )

rE
uE A





rE
e(uE A−ρ)T = K̃(rE ) − χ + χ −
e−ρT ,
uE A

dened in Lemma 4. The comparative statics are:

∂T
∂ K̃
∂T
∂ K̃
∂T
∂ K̃
> 0,
> 0;
< 0,
< 0;
> 0,
>0
∂rE
∂rE
∂uE
∂uE
∂χ
∂χ

and

∂T
< 0.
∂K0

As far as the impact of repression on this solution is concerned, intuitively we
obtain that increasing repression expenditures is a means to delay the revolution,
which will occur for a larger stock of resource. Indeed, the larger

rE ,

the higher

the cost of switching and the larger the compensation must be for the citizens.
This compensation takes the form of the achievement of the second regime,
whose protability is determined by the dierence
size). Regarding the other parameters, the larger

K̃(rE )−χ (the remaining cake
uE , i.e. the more unequal the

country is in the absence of concessions by the elite, the lower the opportunity
cost of switching and the sooner the political regime change. In addition, with a
large

uE ,

the citizens accept to start the second regime with a lower amount of

economic resources. Finally, a larger initial stock of resources tends to expedite
the decision to revolt.
Taking the reaction function

(T (rE ), K̃(rE ))

as given, the next step goes

through a measure of the impact of a change in repression on the elite's value
in the rst regime.

K̃ (rE )
be the elasticity of the desired switching level
Let σ(K̃) = rEK̃(r
E)
00
w.r.t the repression level. If σ(K̃) < − rEψψ0 (r(rE )E ) for all rE ∈ [0, rE ] and
1
∂CE
(t;rE )
E (rE )
|rE =rE > 0 then, ∂V∂r
> 0 for all admissible rE .
∂rE
E

Lemma 5

0
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The following proposition nally summarizes our results in the two possible
scenarios, low

vs.

Proposition 2

high RR:

Under the conditions of Lemmas 4 and 5:

•

In the low RR scenario, there is a unique equilibrium where the revolution
occurs in nite time and the elite set rE∗ = rE .

•

In the high RR scenario, the unique equilibrium features permanent dictatorship and rE∗ = r̃E .

Under the repression strategy, the trick consists once again in determining
the sign of the derivative of the value function of the elite with respect to the

rE .

This mainly boils down to determining how the consumption of the elite,

in the rst regime, responds to a change in the repression level. It appears that
an increase in

rE

has two opposing (scale) eects on the elite's consumption.

The eects are more easily seen when rewriting consumption as:





rE
rE
1
− χ−
e−uE AT (rE ) e(uE A−ρ)t
CE
(t; rE ) = ρ K0 −
uE A
uE A
Both the initial condition and the global switching cost are reduced by an

true

rE
values, or the values that
uE A . The resulting dierences dene the
16 Then, the analysis runs
matter to the elite when deciding how much to repress.

amount

as follows. Other things equal, more repression means that revolution will occur
later and consequently the associated loss is felt less acutely, which stimulates
consumption. However, at the same time, an increase in

rE

implies that less

resources are left for consumption and investment at every date in regime 1.
This in turn tends to lower the elite's consumption. Now, it appears that if the
elasticity of the desired switching level,

K̃(rE ),

with respect to repression is low

enough and lower than the sensitivity of the marginal switching with respect
to this strategy, then the overall eect is positive: Regime 1 consumption is
higher the larger

rE .

Under this condition we nally obtain that the value

function of the elite is strictly increasing in

rE

when the political regime switch

is inevitable. Therefore, in the low RR scenario, the elite will choose the highest
level of repression in order to lengthen the rst dictatorial regime. By contrast,
when the RR are high, permanent dictatorship is the only possible equilibrium.
In this case, and given that their present value is now decreasing with the level
of repression, the elite set the repression level to the lowest possible value,

r̃E ,

compatible with the absence of regime switch.

5.2

Policy mix

The situation where the elite use both repression and redistribution deserves
a lot of attention because this is actually what is observed in the Arab world.

16 The term in square brackets is a rescaling of the true initial condition obtained by subtracting the true global cost incurred at the date of the revolution, T (rE ), discounted from
the initial period at the autonomous growth rate of the stock of economic resources.
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From a technical point of view, it goes without saying that it is also the much
more challenging case to study.

In fact, to the best of our knowledge, there

is no paper in the literature on political transitions that deals with the case
where the elite have to choose a mix between redistribution and repression. In
order to have a chance to get (partial) analytical results, and for a reason that
will be clear in a moment, we restrict the analysis to the situation where the
revolution is unavoidable when the elite use a single instrument. According to
Lemmas 1 & 4, this is guaranteed for instance when the ordering between the
thresholds and the boundaries of the domain of denition of the actual DSC is

ψ < ψ̃u < ψ < ψ̃r .17

First we state another technical Lemma which basically

extends the conditions used in previous Lemmas to the situation where both
and

rE

uE

can vary in their respective domain of denition.

Lemma 6 Let ζ be the set of combinations (rE , uE ) that make the the autocratic regime permanent: ζ = {(rE , uE ) ∈ [uE , ûE ] × [r̂E , rE ]/rE ≥ κ(uE )},
where κ(uE ) is the relation obtained when solving ω(uE , rE ) = 0, with (ûE , r̂E )
dened such that ûE = 1 − (1 − uE )eρ(ψ̃r −ψ) and ψ(r̂E ) = ψ̃u . Let further
κ0 (uE )
rE ψ 00 (rE )
assume that σ(κ) = uEκ(u
<
1
,
σ(
K̃)|
<
−
u
=u
E
)
ψ 0 (rE ) , |σ(T )|rE =r E ≤ 1
E
E
and TrE uE > 0 for all admissible (uE , rE ).
Then the following result can be shown (see the Appendix D):

Under the conditions of Lemma 6, there exists a unique equilibrium where the elite adopt the policy-mix (ûE , rE ), which allows them to keep
the citizens under control forever.
Proposition 3

The conditions of Lemma 6 may seem very dicult to interpret. As mentioned above, most of these conditions are strengthened versions of the ones
used in Lemma 3 and 5 notably. They ensure that the fundamentals are quite
stable and allow us to perform some comparisons between the elite's dierent
options. In addition, we may abstract from most of these conditions except the

18

rst one. This would be enough to conduct the discussion to follow.

Let us now go back to an important question raised by the paper: What
is the best strategy for the elite? The answer to this question is not trivial in
general and depends on the particular criterion one has in mind to evaluate the
best outcome. At rst glance, one may reply that the best strategy is the one

17 The following reasoning can easily be
18 Under this condition, the value of the

extended to the other possible cases.
elite is monotonically increasing in uE in a permanent autocratic regime with a policy mix. As already observed in Section 3.2, a change in uE
is accompanied by positive growth and scale eects. There is now an additional negative scale
that goes through the change in repression induced by the change in redistribution. In fact,
the elite choose a combination (uE , rE ) on the frontier of the set ζ , i.e. the elite choose for
any uE the minimum rE that allows them to maintain the autocratic system: rE = κ(uE ).
Thus any increase in uE must be compensated by an increase in rE in order to remain on
the frontier. In some sense, the condition σ(κ) < 1 tells us that the elite should be relatively
(more) ecient in repressing the people. The last (new) condition, that involves the cross
derivative TrE uE , basically means that when the elite make less concessions (uE increases),
the switching time chosen by the citizens becomes more sensitive to the level of repression.
18

that allows the elite to stay in power forever, if possible. Then, from what has
been shown above in the particular case where

ψ < ψ̃u < ψ < ψ̃r ,

the policy

mix is the best option for the elite in the sense that it allows them to stay in
power when a single strategy fails to do so.

And the temptation is great to

conclude that the policy-mix is intrinsically the best strategy.

In concluding

this discussion, we want however to emphasize a crucial point. If the success
in keeping the political control is a rst acceptable and relevant criterion to
identify the best strategy, it may not always be so clear and forceful. Indeed,
it may well be that the elite, by using an instrument only and accepting the
regime change, are better o than by implementing a policy mix of the type
discussed above. Put dierently, the present value associated with the former
strategy may be higher than the one yielded by the latter. Therefore, according
to the criterion of (maximizing) the present value, accepting the revolution and
adapting to this event may constitute the optimal strategy of the elite. Unfortunately, any attempt to go deeper into this discussion is vain. The comparison
between the values provided by the dierent strategies appears to be a dicult
exercise and doesn't allow us to identify the set of conditions under which this
provocative result holds. As an illustration of the various conicting (growth
and scale) eects at stake, let's have a quick look at the comparison between

(uE , rE , T ) = (uE , 0, T (uE ))  and the
(uE , rE , T ) = (ûE , rE , ∞). In this particular case, it can easily

the equilibrium with concession only 
policy mix 

be shown that growth prospects are higher at the policy mix solution.

But,

how the scale eect exactly plays is unclear. If the elite redistribute much more
resources at the solution with concession, they don't spend a penny to repress
the citizens whereas, with the policy mix, they devote a lot of resources to the
military budget. In general, it is possible neither to know which solution the
scale eect benet to, nor to conclude which eect prevails (when the scale eect
pushes in the opposite direction as the growth eect).

6 Implications for the Arab Spring
We now show how our theory can be useful to understand some key aspects of a
salient phenomenon like the Arab Spring. The theory essentially puts forward
the so-called direct switching costs (DSC) faced by the opposition, and the repression/redistribution strategy followed by the elite. Applying it to any context
therefore requires a certain knowledge of both aspects. Of course, it makes little
sense to calibrate our highly stylized model, especially in the Arab context,

19

but it is worthwhile to check some key predictions of the model on a few countries using some available indicators of the DSC and repression/redistribution in
these countries. A further complication is that the DSC, as outlined in Section

19 Arab ocial statistics, particularly those related to redistribution and inequality, are
almost systematically manipulated by the ruling governments. For example, as pointed out
by Ali (2003), ocial statistics show a very clear decline in inequality - as measured by the
Gini coecient - in Arab countries throughout the 90s, in total contradiction with direct
observations.
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2, entail quite dierent components related either to the vulnerability of the
elite or the coordination costs on the side of the opposition, some controllable
by the elite and others no. To provide with a quick assessment of the theory,
we shall measure repression by military expenditures (as a percentage of GDP)
and redistribution by public expenditures in welfare services like health and education (in percentage of GDP), while the DSC will be tentatively captured by
military expenditures again (for vulnerability) and education attainments and
(skilled) unemployment rate (for coordination costs).

It goes without saying

20 but they do allow to see how the

that these indicators are far from exhaustive

theory works. The inclusion of the unemployment rate, in particular among the
skilled and young individuals, on the side of the coordination costs is worthwhile
(and even necessary) to get through the Arab Spring. Indeed, beside the antidemocratic nature of ruling governments, Arab countries have in common high
unemployment rates, in particular among young and graduate people, probably
the highest in the world (see Masood, 2012). Given the age pyramid in these
countries, this is a key issue from the political equilibrium point of view in these
countries. So far, Arab governments have largely resorted to the public sector
and some special programs to foster youth employment (see Boucekkine and
Bouklia-Hassane, 2011, for the Algerian case). This is captured through the redistribution variable in our model. On the other side, the skilled unemployment
problem has a potentially huge impact on the coordination costs, and thus on
the DSC. First, in many Arab countries (see details below), the ed ucational
attainments have been increasing over time, which lowers the DSC. Second, the
associated skill mismatch problem in the labor markets and induced huge unemployment rates among the skilled is arguably a more decisive factor decreasing

21 Next, we will display some available

the DSC and pushing people to revolt.

statistics of the selected indicators. The specic cases of Tunisia, Bahrain and
Algeria will be discussed in the light of our theory right after.

6.1

Some useful statistics

Concerning

repression

as captured by military expenditures as a percentage of

GDP, there is a quite large variability among Arab countries. Before the Arab
Spring, this ratio ranged from 1.3% in Tunisia to 8.6% in Saudi Arabia in 2010
according to the World Bank (the gures for Algeria and Bahrain being respectively 3.5% and 3%). Interestingly enough, this ratio has increased markedly
after 2011 in these countries.
Concerning

redistribution

22

as measured by welfare and education public ex-

penditures, the picture is more involved. Arab public expenditures on health (as
a percentage of GDP) are not strikingly high or low among developing countries;
in particular, they are far from the Western world gures, even for the very rich

20 For example, food subsidies is an interesting indicator of redistribution but we couldn't
include it for data availability and reliability.
21 Needless to say, for revolutions to get launched, a triggering spark is typically needed.
Our model is about the deterministic forces leading to political transitions.
22 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS/
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Gulf countries (in 2010, only 2.6% in Saudi Arabia or 1.6% is Qatar against

23 Jordan is by

8.4% in the US or 3.4% in Togo to cite a developing country).

far the Arab country which spends the most on public health (5.7%) followed
by Tunisia (3.8%), Algeria (3.3%) and Bahrain (3%).
Education is another key factor which is relevant to assess redistribution and
does matter in the DSC as well (see below).

From the former point of view,

Tunisia is the Arab country which has invested the most in education: about
6.4% of the GDP went to public education in 2007, slightly above the French
gure for example.

Algeria and the the other oil exporters in the Gulf rank

clearly behind: 4.4% for Algeria and 3.4% for Bahrain in 2007. Overall, Arab
countries devoted around 4% of their GDP to education in that year, above the
average of developing countries (see Breisinger et al., 2012). This eort, which

24 has signicantly

started mostly after the independence of the Arab countries,

increased the number of years of schooling in these countries (5.3 years in average
in 1999, ahead of South Asia for example and only one year behind East Asia
and Latin America, see Masood, 2012).
Let's have a look now at the selected indicators for the coordination costs side
of

the direct switching costs (DSC).

One is educational attainments, which

is not always perfectly correlated with public education spending. One relevant
indicator in this respect is the literacy rate in the 15-24 years old population,
given the age pyramid in the Arab countries (and the role of the youth in
the street revolutions). For the three countries considered here below (Algeria,
Bahrain and Tunisia), the gure is close to 100%, the lowest gures of the
Arab world (close to 80%) being registered for countries like Egypt, Yemen or

25

Morroco.

If the educational attainment for the three countries as captured by the literacy rate of the youth is excellent, another quality indicator is much worse: as
outlined by Masood (2012), education plays signicantly against employment in
all Arab countries (starting with Tunisia), which is clearly indicative of a major
skill mismatch, and the unemployment rate of the youth in the MENA region
is the highest in the world (10 percentage points above the world average in
2010).

The extent of the skilled youth unemployment problem in this region

is indeed huge ranging from 25% to 45% for those with tertiary education, a
striking economic ineciency and a major source of grievance in these countries.

6.2

Three country cases

To see how our theory may be used to understand the Arab Spring, notably
the variety of outcomes observed, consider the cases of Tunisia, Bahrain and

23 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PUBL.ZS/
24 At the time, the education eort was seen as a way to complete

independence, and by no
way a self-preservation strategy by the elite.
25 See http:\data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.1524.LT.ZS/. These gures should
not hide a signicant illiteracy problem for older ages and a gender issue in several Arab
countries as documented in Breisinger et al. (2012).
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Algeria (which is to a certain extent close to other Gulf monarchies like Saudi
Arabia) are illustrative enough. A key point in our application is the distinction
between the actual DSC,

ψ(rE , .), and the threshold levels, ψ̃ , highlighted in our

theoretical analysis. Recall that while redistribution does not aect the DSC
directly, they do change the opportunity cost to revolt via the threshold

Tunisia-

ψ̃ .

The Tunisian case is special for essentially two main reasons:

it's

the country with the lowest military expenditures (as a percentage of GDP)
and at the same time it's the country with the best educational eort and
attainment.

ψ(rE , .),

Both elements already imply a lower value for the actual DSC,

with respect to the other Arab countries: from the double point of

view of vulnerability and coordination costs, the actual Tunisian DSC look
denitely more favorable to regime changes. Moreover, though mass (skilled)
youth education is shared by all Arab countries, it is certainly especially acute
in a country like Tunisia, involving a further larger impact on coordination

26 Finally the margins of redistribution are much tighter

costs and actual DSC.

in a country like Tunisia than in oil exporting countries: there is no way for
this country to manipulate the threshold

ψ̃

and bring it to low enough values

compared to actual DSC.

Bahrain-

Since his arrival in oce in 1999, Sheikh Hamad has started a se-

quence of democratization and political liberalization steps leading many international organizations to believe that the country has denitely improved regarding protection of human rights. This relatively low level of repression shows
up in the military expenditures statistics shown above: among the rich oil exporting countries like Saudi Arabia or Algeria ranked clearly behind in 2010.
The distinctive feature of Bahrain is, however, what the religious majority of the
country (the Shias) felt as an unfair redistribution of resources. In 2006, despite
a per head income of close to
earns less than

$600

$20,000,

a third of the native Bahraini workforce

27 . In this context, our theory would predict a

a month.

revolution and a regime change at nite time (relatively low actual DSC and
relatively large threshold,

ψ̃ ,

due to unfair redistribution).

Indeed, the Shias

revolt took place in 2011 but the massive external intervention of Saudi Arabia
to back the Khalifa dynasty changed the outcome. A large enough exogenous
increase in the DSC through external intervention as in Bahrain would change

28

the equilibrium to permanent dictatorship.

Algeria-

Algeria is a case where despite some early demonstrations, no regime

change took place. It's interesting to compare it with the Tunisian neighbor.
It's no question that the success of the Jasmine revolution did weaken the Algerian power.

29 However, up to now, no regime change has been observed in

Algeria. Two main reasons could be invoked according to our theory. One is

26 See for example http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/newsletter/articles-2012/
en_GB/06-07-2012-Drine/
27 See http://www.economist.com/node/8326066

28 In a straightforward extension of our model with random revolution success such as the
probability of success is a decreasing function of total repression forces, we would get that the
Shias would have not revolted if they would have anticipated the Saudi intervention.
29 In this sense, contagion eects can be understood as driving down the actual DSC.
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straightforward and has to do with actual DSC: the Algerian regime is much
less vulnerable than the Tunisian in military and police terms, involving larger
actual DSC. The second is denitely more interesting and has to do with the
threshold,

ψ̃ :

in contrast to Tunisia, a rich oil exporting country like Algeria can

go for a massive redistribution of the rents (signicantly decreasing
fore discouraging revolts.

ψ̃ ),

there-

The same argument can be put forward to explain

institutional stability of the Gulf monarchies during the 2011 events: Just like
Algeria, these countries have spent a substantial part of their petrodollars to
buy time.

30

7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided with a benchmark dynamic game theory designed to capture the essential features of the Arab Spring.

Beside several

innovative technicalities, we have shown how incorporating explicit revolution
timing decisions may considerably enrich the discussion, and in some cases, challenge the conventional wisdom in the related literature. It goes without saying,
as one can infer from the previous section, that as any benchmark, some further
renements are needed to increase the relevance of the theory and its ability
to explain the mechanisms behind the Arab Spring sequence. Part of the work
to be done consists in endogenizing some key factors determining the DSC. In
particular public education spending decisions by the elite and its impact on
citizens' propensity to revolt are important to incorporate for a closer understanding of the timing and success of the revolts in Arab countries. Also, the
analysis may be extended by allowing the elite to revise her repression and/or
redistribution strategy in face of the threat of revolution and changing environments (either external geopolitical shocks like a military intervention in favor
of one of the 2 groups, or economic shocks aecting the protability of the resource economy). This would require a substantial technical upgrading. In this
respect, the methodology developed by Long et al. (2014) may help.

Appendix
A Technical details: Section 3
•

General solution in regime 2: Solving for the symmetric MPE by making use

of the necessary optimality conditions (NOC), one obtains:



K 2 (t) = (K̃ − χ)e(A−2δ)(t−T ) ,
Ci2 (t) = δ(K̃ − χ)e(A−2δ)(t−T ) .

Computing the integral of discounted consumption ows then yields the value
reporter in (4).

30 This said, in none of these cases, the status-quo seems sustainable, see for example the
excellent recent book by Christopher Davidson (2013) on the sustainability of Gulf monarchies.
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• From direct manipulations of the NOC corresponding to regime 1, one has:
 1
 K (t) = φeuE At + (K0 − φ)e(uE A−δ)t
(16)
C 1 (t) = δ(K0 − φ)e(uE A−δ)t
 E
CP1 (t) = (1 − uE )A[φeuE At + (K0 − φ)e(uE A−δ)t ]
with

φ

an unknown. When there is no threat of revolution (T

= ∞),

using the

transversality condition, one nds:


rE
(uE A−δ)t
+ urEEA

 K(t) = (K0 − uE A )e 
CE (t) = δ K0 − urEEA e(uE A−δ)t


CP (t) = (1 − uE )A[(K0 − urEEA )e(uE A−δ)t +

(17)

rE
uE A ],

and the resulting present value, for the elite, is given by (5).

B Proof of Lemmas 2, 3 & Proposition 1
• Lemma 2: First, the left-continuity of the capital stock at the switching date
T , the general expression of K 1 (t) for all t ≤ T being given in (16), implies
K 1 (T ) = K̃(uE ) ⇔ φeuE AT + (K0 − φ)e(uE A−ρ)T = K̃(uE ).
Second, the transversality condition associated with

T <∞

(18)

for the elite's

problem in regime 1, is:

e−ρT λ1E (T ) = e−ρT

∂VE2 (.)
⇔ (K0 − φ)e(uE A−ρ)T = K̃(uE ) − χ.
∂K

Substituting the value of

φ

(19)

given by (18) in (19), one obtains

K0 e(uE A−ρ)T = χ



1
eω(uE ) − 1

+ e−ρT


,

which must be studied to show the existence of a strictly positive and nite

uE being given. Noticing that under Assumptions 2 & 3, we have
uE A−ρ > 0 for all uE , then we obtain that there exists a unique 0 < T (uE ) < ∞
0
i K̃(uE ) > K0 . Given that K̃ (uE ) < 0, K̃(ūE ) > K0 is sucient to ensure
existence for all uE ∈ [uE , ūE ].
switching date,

• Lemma 3: When T (uE ) ∈ (0, ∞) exists, using the denition of K̃(uE ), the
VE2 (.) and the solution valid is regime 1, which is



−δ(t−T (uE ))
1
u A(t−T (uE ))

1 + e eω(uE ) −1
,
 K (t; uE ) = χe E

expression of

C 1 (t; uE ) = eω(uδχ
e(uE A−δ)(t−T (uE )) ,
E ) −1

 E
1
CP (t; uE ) = (1 − uE )AK 1 (t; uE ),
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the derivative in (15) can be rewritten as


1



(1−uE )A
ρn

eω(uE )
eω(uE ) −1



− AT (uE )[1 + σ(uE )] + ρT 0 (uE )
∂VE (uE )
o
=
∂uE
ρ  −e−ρT (uE ) T 0 (uE ) [(1 − uE )A − ρ] + A .
ρ
1
1−uE

−

Under Assumption 3, it's easy to check that if

ρ
uE = 1− A

and

|σ(uE )| ≤ 1

∂VE (uE )
< 0, with σ(T )
then
∂uE
optimal choice is uE = uE .

uE ∈ [uE , ūE ].

Hence, the

=

uE ≥
uE T 0 (uE )
, for all
T (uE )

31

Discussion following Lemma 3: Elite's consumption can be rewritten as:

1
CE
(t; uE ) = ρK̂0 (uE )e(uE A−ρ)t
Its derivative w.r.t

uE

with

K̂0 (uE ) = K0 − χe−uE AT (uE ) .

is

h
i
1
∂CE
(t; uE )
= ρ K̂00 (uE ) + AtK̂0 (uE ) e(uE A−ρ)t ,
∂uE
with,

K̂00 (uE ) = χAT (uE )e−uE AT (uE ) [1 + σ(T )].

(20)

The second term in (20) is a

positive growth eect whereas the rst term is as scale eect, which is positive
only if

•

|σ(uE )| ≤ 1.

Proposition 1: The material in Lemma 1-3 together with the observation

that the elite's value is increasing in

uE

in a permanent autocratic regime (see

(5)) are sucient to state Proposition 1. As stated in Lemma 1, when the DSC

ω(uE ) < 0), the elite has two options available. Either,
uE ∈ [uE , ũE ], which implies that ω(uE ) ≤ 0: The
∗
unique equilibrium must be of the never switching type with uE = ũE . Or,
the elite can x the sharing rule to a level uE ∈ (ũE , uE ]. In this case, the

is high (and such that

they choose a sharing rule

equilibrium candidate may exhibit a regime change.
the elite is decreasing in

uE

uE

Given that the value of

(Lemma 3), the optimal decision would be to set

to the lowest possible level. However, this critical redistribution rate,

ũE ,

is

not achievable because the interval corresponding to a solution with a regime
change is open on the left.

Since there is no solution to the elite's problem,

there is no equilibrium featuring a transition between the two political regimes.

C Proof of Lemmas 4, 5 & Proposition 2
Upper bound of the domain of denition of

rE :

Again, our argument is based on

the principle that the elite's value should be at least as high as the citizens' one
in a permanent autocracy.

However, the citizens' value cannot be computed

so easily (as we did in Section 3.2, see (6)) with positive repression.

So, we

resort to the condition that the elite's consumption is always higher than the
citizens' consumption under permanent dictatorship.

31 Comparing

From (17), a sucient

this expression with the one in (17), with rE = 0, it turns out that the growth
rate of consumption is similar. The striking dierence is the existence of a scale eect. Elite
consumption is lower at the equilibrium with a regime change, uE being given.
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E )A)
. This
CE (0) > CP (0) ⇔ rE ≤ uE AK0 (ρ−(1−u
ρ
VE (rE ) > VP (rE ). All this information is summarized in

condition for this to hold is
in turn ensures that
Assumption 4:

Under the repression strategy, the upper bound of the domain
E )A)
is dened by: rE = uE AK0 (ρ−(1−u
, which implies that VE (rE ) > VP (rE ) for
ρ
all rE ≤ rE .

Assumption 4

•

Citizens' switching problem (Lemma 4): From (7) with

uE = uE

(Section

4.1), the necessary optimal condition for switching is:

ln

K̃
K̃ − χ

!

A
= − 2 + ln
ρ



ρ
[1 − uE ]A


− ρψ(rE ) ≡ ω(rE ).

χeω(rE )
that solves this equation i
eω(rE ) −1
In addition, we can dene a second critical threshold for the DSC:

There exists a unique

K̃(rE ) =

1
ψ̃r =
ρ



ω(rE ) > 0.


A
ln(ρ) − ln[(1 − uE )A] + − 2 .
ρ

This is sucient to state Lemma 4.

•

Switching time: From the transversality condition of regime 1 and the left

continuity of the resource stock,


K0 −
The condition

T (rE )

rE
uE A



T

is implicitly given by:



rE
e(uE A−ρ)T = K̃(rE ) − χ + χ −
e−ρT
uE A

K̃(rE ) > K0

(21)

is sucient for the existence of a unique solution

to this equation (for a given

rE ).

The solution corresponding to regime

1 then reads as follows:




r

 K 1 (t; rE ) = χ − uEEA euE A(t−T (rE )) + (K̃(rE ) − χ)e(uE A−ρ)(t−T (rE )) +
C 1 (t; rE ) = ρ(K̃(rE ) − χ)e(uE A−ρ)(t−T (rE ))

 E
CP1 (t; rE ) = (1 − uE )AK 1 (t; rE ).

rE
uE A

(22)

•

Proof of Lemma 5:

Let's assess the impact of a change in

rE

on con-

sumption (other comparative statics can easily be derived from the denition of

K̃(rE )

and (21)):

1
∂CE
(t; rE )
1
= CE
(t; rE )
∂rE

!
K̃ 0 (rE )
0
− (uE A − ρ)T (rE ) ,
K̃(rE ) − χ

with, from (21),


e(uE A−ρ)T (rE ) − e−ρT (rE )


T (rE ) =
.
(uE A − ρ)(K̃(rE ) − χ) + uE A χ − urEEA e−ρT (rE )
0

K̃ 0 (rE ) +

1
uE A

26

After straightforward manipulations,

uE A
K̃ 0 (rE )
uE A − ρ K̃(rE ) − χ


χ−

1
∂CE
(t;rE )
∂rE

rE
uE A


>

>0

is equivalent to:


1  uE AT (rE )
e
−1 .
uE A

(23)

Dene the RHS of (23) as G(rE ). This function is increasing in rE . If
rE ψ 00 (rE )
K̃ 0 (rE )
− ψ0 (rE ) > σ(K̃) = rEK̃(r
(> 0) for all rE ∈ [0, rE ] then, the LHS of
E)
the inequality above, denoted by F (rE ), is decreasing in rE . Now, imposing
1
(t; rE ) is increasing in rE for
F (rE ) > G(rE ) is sucient to conclude that CE
all t ≥ 0.
Optimal choice of the repression level

rE ∈ [0, rE ]:

The present value of the

elite when the revolution occurs in nite time is:

Z

T (rE )

VE (rE ) =

1
ln(CE
(t; rE ))e−ρt dt + e−ρT (rE ) VE2 (K̃(rE ) − χ),

0

rE , one obtains:

1
E)
R T (rE ) ∂CE∂r(t;r


−ρt
E

dt
1 (t;r ) e
CE
E

∂VE (rE )  0 
=
1
+ ln(CE
(T (rE ); rE ) − ρVE2 (K̃(rE ) − χ) T 0 (rE )e−ρT (rE )

∂rE


 ∂VE2 0
+ ∂K K̃ (rE )e−ρT (rE ) .
Taking the derivative w.r.t

Using the expression of

∂VE (rE )
1
=
∂rE
ρ

1
(.)
CE

(see (22)), this derivative can be rewritten as:

!


K̃ 0 (rE )
−ρT (rE )
0
− uE A − ρ + (A(1 − uE ) − ρ)e
T (rE ) ,
K̃(rE ) − χ

which is positive under the same two conditions that allow us to conclude that
consumption is increasing in

•

rE .

Proof of Proposition 2: A synthesis of the results set in Lemma 4 & 5 is

sucient to establish Proposition 2.

D Proof of Lemma 6 & Proposition 3
• From now on, we allow rE and uE to vary in their respective domains of denii.e. [0, rE ] and [uE , uE ] (Assumption 1-4 hold). Admissible pairs (uE , rE )
must satisfy rE < uE AK0 . Adopting the same methodology as before, we can
show that the switching problem of the citizens denes a unique K̃(rE , uE ) if
and only if ω(rE , uE ) > 0 with:


ρ
A
− ρψ(rE ).
ω(rE , uE ) = − 2 + ln
ρ
[1 − uE ]A
tion,

ω(rE , uE ) = 0 boils down to solving ψ(rE ) = ϕ(uE ). The
ϕ(uE ) = ψ̃r − ρ1 [ln(1 − uE ) − ln(1 − uE )] > 0 for all uE and satises

Solving the equation
function
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ϕ0 (uE ) > 0, ϕ(uE ) = ψ̃u and ϕ(uE ) = ψ̃r . Given the particular ordering
considered, it's clear that ψ(rE ) = ϕ(uE ) has a solution because we have ψ <
ϕ(uE ) < ψ < ϕ(uE ). Thus we can dene ûE ∈ (uE , uE ) such that ϕ(ûE ) = ψ
and r̂E ∈ (0, r E ) such that ψ(r̂E ) = ψ̃u . Given that ψ is invertible, for any
uE ∈ [uE , ûE ], the equation ψ(rE ) = ϕ(uE ) can rewritten as a relationship
rE = κ(uE ) with κ(uE ) = ψ −10 (ϕ(uE )), κ0 (uE ) > 0 (and κ00 (uE ) > 0), κ(uE ) =
r̂E and κ(ûE ) = rE . By denition, any pair (rE , uE ) belonging to this locus is
such that ω(rE , uE ) = 0. Then, let ζ be the set such that for any pair taken in
this set dictatorship is permanent because ω(rE , uE ) ≤ 0:
ζ = {(rE , uE ) ∈ [uE , ûE ] × [r̂E , rE ]/rE ≥ κ(uE )} ,
the complementary set being denoted by

ζ.

ζ,

For any pair in

there might exist

an equilibrium with a revolution in nite time.

• The second step consists in determining the optimal combination (rE , uE ) ∈
ζ

under permanent dictatorship: The elite's value is given by (5), which is de-

creasing in

rE

and increasing in

uE .

Thus, for any,

uE ,

lowest level of repression compatible with dictatorship.

the elite choose the

This means that the

optimal combination necessarily lies in the frontier given by

rE = κ(uE ).

Then,

the value can be rewritten as:

VE (uE , κ(uE )) =
Taking the derivative w.r.t





1
κ(uE )
uE A
ln(ρ) + ln K0 −
+
−1 .
ρ
uE A
ρ
uE ,

one obtains:

∂VE
A
κ(uE )
(1 − σ(κ)) + 2
=
κ(uE )
2
∂uE
ρ
uE A(K0 − uE A )
and, for admissible

∂VE
∂uE

•

> 0.

(uE , κ(uE )),

the condition

with

σ(κ) =

uE κ0 (uE )
,
κ(uE )

σ(κ) < 1 is sucient
(ûE , rE ).

to have

This implies that the optimal combination is

The third step shows that permanent dictatorship is indeed the unique

equilibrium when the ordering is

ψ < ψ̃u < ψ < ψ̃r .

Our aim is to generalize

the analyses of Sections 4 & 5.1 and to prove that under the conditions used
in previous Lemmas (in particular 3 and 5), very few is needed to reach the
conclusion.

ζ . This implies that the switching problem has
(K̃(rE , uE ), T (rE , uE )), which is similar to the one characterized in
Appendix C - see (21) and (22) - when one replaces uE with any uE provided that
1
(rE , uE ) ∈ ζ .32 Let's see how the rst period elite's consumption, CE
(t; rE , uE )
responds to changes in rE and uE given that:
Pick up a policy mix from

a solution

1
CE
(t; rE , uE ) = ρ(K̃(rE , uE ) − χ)e(uE A−ρ)(t−T (rE ,uE )) ,
with

K̃(rE ) =

32 Of

χeω(rE ,uE )
.
eω(rE ,uE ) −1

course, the argument uE now becomes apparent in the functions K̃(.) and T (.).
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Partial derivative w.r.t

rE

for any

uE ∈ [uE , ûE ]:33

1
∂CE
(t; rE , uE )
1
= CE
(t; rE , uE )
∂rE

K̃rE
− (uE A − ρ)TrE
K̃(rE , uE ) − χ

!
.

We know that under the conditions of Lemma 5, this derivative is positive at
0
K̃rE
E ,uE )
= ρψ (rE )K̃(r
is decreasing in uE (because
χ
K̃(rE ,uE )−χ
K̃
K̃
K̃uE < 0), we have K̃(r ,urE )−χ |uE ≤ûE > K̃(r ,urE )−χ |uE =uE . Note also that
E
E
E
E
uE A − ρ < uE A − ρ for all uE ∈ [uE , ûE ]. Then the condition TrE uE > 0 for
1
∂CE
(t;rE ,uE )
all (rE , uE ) ∈ ζ is sucient to conclude that
> 0 provided that
∂r

uE = uE .

Given that

E

the conditions of Lemma 5, adapted to the case under scrutiny, hold. The rst
00

condition is

E)
σ(K̃) < − rEψψ0 (r(r
E)

uE and one
uE . Thus, this condition must be
00
E)
. The second technical
< − rEψψ0 (r(r
E)

where the RHS is independent of

can easily check that the LHS is decreasing in
strengthened to require that

σ(K̃)|uE =uE

condition is satised as well.
Moreover, by analogy with what has been done before, consumption can be
rewritten as:

1
CE
(t; uE , rE ) = ρK̂0 (uE , rE )e(uE A−ρ)t

K̂0 (uE , rE ) = K0 −
The partial derivative w.r.t

uE

with

rE
rE −uE AT (uE ,rE )
− (χ −
)e
.
AuE
AuE

for any

rE ∈ [r̂E , rE ]:

h
i
1
(t; uE )
∂CE
= ρ K̂0,uE + AtK̂0 (uE ) e(uE A−ρ)t ,
∂uE
with,

K̂0,uE =


 
rE 
rE
−uE AT (rE ,uE )
1
−
e
+
χ
−
AT (rE , uE )(1 + σ(T )),
Au2E
uE A

σ(T ) =

where

uE TuE
T (rE ,uE ) is increasing in

rE .

Then, extending the condition of

1
∂CE
(t;uE )
> 0.
∂uE
Finally, under the conditions stated above, it's straightforward to show that

Lemma 3 to

|σ(T )|rE =rE ≤ 1

is sucient to conclude that

the present value of the elite at a solution featuring a regime change is decreasing
in

uE

and increasing in

rE .

Thus, there is no equilibrium with a political regime

switching because one cannot nd a pair

(rE , uE ) that maximizes the elite value.
uE but

For instance, the elite would like to choose the highest concession level

then it doesn't exist a repression level such that the pair of instruments belongs
to

ζ.

In sum, when the ordering is

ψ < ψ̃u < ψ < ψ̃r ,

there exists a unique

equilibrium with permanent dictatorship.

33 We

will denote the derivates of K̃ and T w.r.t rE as K̃rE and TrE .
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